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THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY JURY:
WORST OF TIMES OR BEST OF TIMES?
Valerie P. Hans*
I am pleased to be invited to reflect on the
contemporary American jury for this issue of the Criminal
Law Brief In thinking about legal developments, new research
findings, and the continuing swirl of controversy over this
venerable American institution, I observe the same
paradoxical condition that Charles Dickens found in 1 8 th
Century London: "It was the best of times; it was the worst of
times." There is evidence of both the expansion of jury trial
rights, yet contraction of jury trials. Research evidence
indicates that juries perform well, yet the 21 st Century jury
confronts more complex decision making tasks and continuing
doubts about its fairness and competence.1
Our starting point is the rapidly declining us
criminal jury. Centuries ago, trial by jury was the
method of resolving criminal charges; but it has be
downward slide for some time, with judges and es
prosecutors taking over more and more of the jury's fi
Juries waned as the legal system became incr
professionalized. Over the last few decades, a nu
factors have conspired to
reduce jury trial rates even
further. One, of course, is
the increasing cost of a trial. . o
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sentencing guidelines and 'S so
mandatory minimum J ogQ0
sentences constitutes another "000
important factor. Guidelines
and mandatory minimum
sentences make the gamble
of a jury trial less attractive
to defendants and
consequently bolster the
power of prosecutors to
settle cases through plea
agreements.
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medical examiners, doctors, psychologists, firearms and
ballistic specialists, or DNA analysts. In a recent study of state
criminal jury trials, 56% of the trials included at least one
expert witness, most
typically for the
prosecution. Prosecutors
called experts in just
over half of the trials,
while the defense
employed experts in just
one out of
approximately every ten
trials. 9 Thus criminal juries must regularly evaluate expert
testimony as they decide guilt and innocence. Even
considering the larger gate-keeping role of judges under the
Daubert standard, some research studies raise doubts about
whether juries fully understand complicated scientific
evidence such as DNA that purportedly links a defendant to a
crime or medical testimony that addresses the defendant's
culpability.'°
Whether jury trials include more legally complex
matters is an open question. Certainly, the legal instructions in
capital jury trials have become formidable. The empirical
work on how juries interpret and apply these instructions is
not reassuring."l  Research shows that revising judicial
instructions in line with cognitive and linguistic knowledge
can readily improve comprehension, but with some
exceptions, jurisdictions have been slow to revise their
criminal jury instructions. 2
Jury trials have declined, yet public exposure to jury
trials through the media remains substantial. Pretrial publicity
has always been a problematic issue in high profile trials, but
in today's high visibility trials it is at another order of
magnitude. In addition to CourtTV's gavel-to-gavel coverage
of jury trials nationwide, the media coverage of sensational
trials like those of pop icon Michael Jackson and business and
corporate executives such as Martha Stewart present major
challenges for judges and worries about potential bias for
attorneys.
Take the case of Scott Peterson, the California man
accused of killing his pregnant wife Laci Peterson on
Christmas Eve 2003 and dumping her body in the bay. News
coverage of the police search, the discovery of Laci Peterson's
decomposed body and that of her unborn child in the bay,
police reports identifying Scott Peterson as a suspect, and
nonstop news reports of Scott Peterson's affairs, arrest, and
evidence against him surely skewed the jury pool. 13 Once the
trial began, the saturation media coverage influenced the
jury's composition and, some argued, even its decision to
sentence Scott Peterson to death. 14 Research on the multiple
effects of pretrial publicity on jury decision making finds that
such publicity negatively affects jurors' initial impressions of
the defendant, their evaluation of trial evidence, and the
reial Thesc l 1net Its uneofrscorDeth ie o
vigorously manage high profile criminal jury trials. 16
New studies have also confirmed that despite
substantial reforms in the jury selection process, jury service
remains unequally distributed. Primarily because of a
differential response to jury summons, the young, the poor,
and racial and ethnic minorities continue to be
underrepresented in many jury pools.i
Another problem is the enduring significance of race
in jury selection. Because of substantial progress in jury
summoning methods, American jury pools are much more
diverse today than in previous times.18 Furthermore, a line of
Supreme Court decisions has been aimed at eradicating the
adversaries' reliance on prospective jurors' race and ethnicity
in their exercise of peremptory challenges. 19 Beginning with
Batson v. Kentucy 2 ° in 1986 through the Miller-El v. Dretke2 '
case in 2005, the Court continues to insist that peremptory
challenges be free of racial considerations. Yet recent studies
of prosecutor and defense peremptory challenges show that
2the juror's race and ethnicity continues to play a role.
Prosecutors are much more likely to challenge African-
Americans, while defense attorneys are more apt to challenge
Caucasians. Evidence of the persistent effect of race in
peremptory challenges has led to demands that peremptory
challenges be reduced drastically or eliminated altogether.23
Yes, it is a gloomy picture, but consider these
developments. The United States Supreme Court surprised
legal commentators with an important series of decisions that
strongly reaffirmed the right to a jury trial. The Court, in
Apprendi v. New Jersey,2 4 held that a defendant's jury trial
right extends to any contested sentencing-related fact that has
to be proven in order for a judge to impose a sentence above
the statutory maximum sentence that would otherwise apply.
A subsequent decision in Blakely v. Washington2 5 stated that
the Apprendi rule governs even when the contested fact can be
used to increase the sentence above an otherwise applicable
sentencing guidelines-imposed maximum sentence. Thus, the
Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to
any fact determination that is required to increase the sentence
above the maximum sentence that otherwise would be
Spring 2006
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available under a guidelines system. 26 In United States v.
Booker, however, the Court declined to make jury fact-finding
in sentencing mandatory in the federal context; instead, it
made the federal sentencing guidelines advisory rather than
binding, rendering the Apprendi rule inapplicable.2
The end result is that the jury is now destined to
become a major player in the sentencing process in state-
although perhaps not federal-courts. Since most criminal
jury trials occur in state rather than federal court, we will see
state courts and state legislatures experimenting with ways to
present disputed sentencing facts to the jury.28 Some
commentators argue that jury sentencing will be more
democratic, 29 while others express concern that juries will not
be up to the task.3" A new analysis of criminal trials and
sentences just before and after the Apprendi decision finds that
providing defendants the right to have sentencing facts
determined by juries benefits criminal
offenders.3' Interestingly, the current Supreme
Court docket includes cases that examine the [T]he i
scope of the Confrontation Clause as well as
cases that explore the propriety of withholding in cr
evidence from the jury, underscoring the consti
significance the Court appears to be attaching to sec
fact-finding in the adversary jury trial.32  Supren
I am optimistic that if courts and havee
legislatures properly structure the task of
sentencing, juries can perform competently.
Empirical studies are reassuring about the basic
soundness of jury decision making. Systematic studies have
repeatedly shown that the strength of the evidence presented at
trial is the major determinant of jury verdicts.33 When the
evidence is strong for conviction, the jury (and judge)
convicts, and when it is moderate to weak, the jury (and judge)
acquits.3 4 In research projects surveying judges, attorneys, and
jurors who participated in criminal trials, judges are found to
agree with the vast majority of jury verdicts, seeing them as
based on the trial evidence rather than the jury's biases and
prejudices.35 Indeed, the jury's verdict overlaps with the
verdict the judge would have reached in most cases.
But what about the greater complexity of
contemporary trials? Kalven and Zeisel dealt with the
evidence complexity question by assessing the agreement rate
between the jury verdict and the judge's hypothetical verdict
in easy and complex cases.36 They found that juries and judges
agreed just the same in easy and complex cases, suggesting
that evidence complexity was not a major cause of judge-jury
disagreement. The National Center for State Courts study of
cases from 2000-2001 found similarly that judicial agreement
with jury verdicts did not vary as a function of either
evidentiary or legal complexity. 37 The NCSC project also
found, however, that, compared to jurors in cases in which all
of the criminal charges were resolved by verdicts, jurors in
cases that hung on one or more charges were more likely to
describe their cases as complex.38 Hung jurors reported that
their juries had more difficulty understanding the evidence,
expert testimony, and the law in the case.39 Case complexity
may not lead criminal juries to reach a different verdict from
the judge, but it appears to make it more difficult to arrive at a
verdict.
Jury trial reforms can remedy some of the problems
jurors face in complicated trials.4 ° Over the last two decades, a
widespread movement for jury reform has swept through
American courts. Many states have formed commissions to
examine their jury selection and trial procedures, to review
relevant studies, and to propose legal and procedural
changes. 41 Substantial research on trial reforms has already
been conducted and more is underway.42 The American Bar
Association drew on this body of work in revising its
Principles for Juries
Sight to a jury trial
iminal cases as a
tutional matter is
ure, and recent
e Court decisions
xpanded its scope.
and Jury Trials, which were adopted as
ABA policy in February of 2005.4 3 For
example, the commentary
accompanying the Principles describes
empirical work supporting a return to
12-person unanimous juries, showing
that larger juries that must deliberate to
a unanimous verdict are more
representative of the community and
more accurate in decision-making.44
Similarly, the principles that jurors be
permitted to take notes, ask questions of
witnesses, and employ jury notebooks
are supported by research studies showing the benefits of these
techniques.45
One project compared the value of different jury trial
46reforms for complex evidence comprehension. Mock juries,
composed of members of a state court jury pool, watched a
one-hour videotape of a trial that included dueling expert
testimony about mitochondrial DNA evidence.4 Some mock
juries solely watched the videotape and then deliberated to a
verdict, while other groups were able to take notes, ask
questions of experts, refer to jury notebooks, employ a
checklist, or take advantage of multiple techniques. 48 The
mock jurors overall showed relatively good comprehension of
the complex scientific evidence. Furthermore, certain analyses
showed improvement for jurors who were given jury
notebooks or checklists. 49 However, even these reforms had
modest impact, leading the authors to suggest that jury
tutorials and court-appointed experts should be assessed for
their use in complex trials.50
Despite the potential of these reforms for improving
jury comprehension in criminal trials, commentators have
expressed some concerns about particular techniques,
especially permitting jurors to ask questions of witnesses. Jury
questions have the potential to move the jury away from the
strict passivity of the decision maker in the adversary system,
to a more active participant.51 Although there is no empirical
Criminal Law Brief
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evidence that an active jury is more likely to prejudge the
case, we should be mindful of that possibility as we propose
and test modifications to jury trials.
Despite a drop in the proportion of criminal cases that
are resolved by juries, the right to a jury trial in criminal cases
as a constitutional matter is secure, and recent Supreme Court
decisions have expanded its scope. What is more, in recent
years, a number of other countries have adopted the jury or
another form of lay participation into their legal systems.
52
Russia did so after the breakup of the Soviet Union and Spain
incorporated the jury into its justice system following the
dictatorial Franco regime.5 3 Other countries such as Japan,
Korea, and Argentina have debated or have incorporated lay
participation into their legal systems. 54 These international
developments suggest that even though incorporating lay
citizens into the justice system can create some problems, it is
seen as a valued method of promoting legitimacy and
democracy.
On balance, weighing these multiple and competing
developments, I cannot conclude that these are either the best
or the worst of times for the jury system. For those of us who
study the American criminal jury, however, these certainly
qualify as interesting times!
* Valerie Hans, a nationally recognized preeminent jury
expert has conducted numerous empirical studies relating to
citizen participation in the law. She is one of the leading
national experts on the jury system. Her writing has focused
on such topics as the juvenile death penalty, racial and gender
discrimination, the litigation explosion, corporate
responsibility, the insanity defense, and media impact. Her
books include Business on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate
Responsibility (2000); The Jury System: Contemporary
Scholarship (2006, forthcoming) and Judging the Jury (1986,
coauthored with Neil Vidmar).
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suggestions on an earlier draft, and Julie Jones for her
excellent research assistance.
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